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This paper presents the results of one of the first systematic analyses of the magnitude 
and determinants of transaction costs in public-private partnerships (PPPs). Given limited 
data availability, the analysis is confined to procurement-phase costs of bidding and 
contract negotiation, thus excluding costs related to contract monitoring and renegotiation 
in the operational phase. Notably, no attempt is made to compare transaction costs in 
PPPs to those in traditional public procurement of investment projects, nor to compare 
them to cost savings achieved through PPPs. Even so, some interesting results emerge. 
As regards the level of transaction costs in the procurement phase, it is estimated that the 
total costs amount on average to well over 10 percent of the capital value of the project. 
Transaction costs to the public sector and the winning bidder vary between countries 
(legal systems) and sectors, and they are significantly higher in small projects (below £25 
million) and in projects that take long (over 50 months) to procure. In contrast, neither 
experience in setting up partnerships nor the number of bidders affect the costs to the 
public sector and the winning bidder. 
 
 
  2 
1. Introduction 
 
At a decade and a half, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are old enough for both 
economic theory and empirical investigation to have tackled most key economic and 
financial issues that are associated with them (see the EIB Papers, 2005, for an 
overview). Most notably, the theoretical analysis of why and under what conditions PPPs 
may be superior to traditional public procurement of investment projects in terms of 
productive efficiency has been established in the framework of the theory of incomplete 
contracts (see Välilä, 2005, for an overview). Also, with an increasing number of PPP 
projects in operation, it has been possible to quantify some of the cost savings that can be 
achieved through PPPs, at least in the procurement phase of the project (Leahy, 2005). 
 
However, one issue that has not received much attention so far concerns transaction costs 
in PPPs. Transaction costs in this context refer to the costs of establishing and 
maintaining a partnership; more specifically, they encompass legal, financial, and 
technical advisory costs incurred by both public and private sectors in the procurement 
and operational phases of a project. Costs for organising the bidding process; 
participating in it; negotiating the contract between the public sector and the winning 
bidder; monitoring the private sector partner’s compliance with the contract and also 
renegotiating the contract during its life-cycle would all be included among transaction 
costs. 
 
While there is widespread perception among practitioners and academics alike that PPPs 
are associated with “high” transaction costs, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic 
study has yet been undertaken to quantify such costs and to analyse their determinants. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK provides anecdotal evidence of high 
transaction costs in many of its reports (see, for example, NAO, 2003 and 2004), as does 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Commons in the UK (PAC, 
2003). Indeed, a project size of at least £20 million is considered necessary for a PPP to 
be a viable option in the UK (HM Treasury, 2003). Torres and Pina (2001) report some 
  3evidence related to the US, noting that it has been reported that the monitoring of the 
performance of the private sector partner in PPP type of arrangements entails extra costs 
anywhere between 3 and 25 percent of the contract value. As a consequence, it has been 
recommended in the US context that monitoring costs of 10 percent of the contract value 
be budgeted in such arrangements. 
 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to offer the first systematic assessment 
of the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs in PPPs. Conversely, this paper 
does not attempt to compare transaction costs in PPPs to those in traditionally procured 
public investment projects. Neither does it attempt to contrast transaction costs with the 
cost savings that PPPs can, under certain circumstances, generate. Both these important 
topics are for future research to address. 
 
Following a brief discussion of why one would expect transaction costs in PPPs to exceed 
those in traditionally procured public investment projects in Section 2, the data material 
used in this study is described in Section 3, and the empirical methodologies employed 
are explained in Section 4. Section 5 reports the results concerning the magnitude of 
transaction costs in PPPs. Section 6 turns the focus on the determinants of the transaction 
costs, and Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
 
2.  Transaction costs in PPPs: some theoretical considerations 
 
There are several reasons why transaction costs in PPPs would be high, especially 
compared to traditional procurement of public investment projects. The main sources of 
higher transaction costs in PPPs are their long-term character, ownership and financing 
structures, and risk-sharing features. Due to all these reasons, the degree of contractual 
incompleteness is high in the case of PPPs, and attempts to reduce that contractual 
incompleteness give rise to correspondingly high transaction costs. Consequently, the 
search (tendering and bidding), contracting, and monitoring processes become more 
resource-consuming than in traditional short-term contracting aimed to supply assets, 
rather than services, to the public sector. Negotiating the contract is especially costly, not 
  4least due to the high cost of advisory services, and such costs are not limited to the pre-
delivery phase, as renegotiation is almost inevitable in contracts that stretch over decades. 
 
Apart from the direct costs related to tendering, contract negotiation, and monitoring, 
Domberger and Jensen (1997) emphasise that the long contract period gives also rise to 
economic costs indirectly. The enforcement of a long-term contract can be difficult 
because the threat of contract termination can only be used if the public sector is 
committed to buying the asset at fair value in case of termination; otherwise, 
expropriation risk would need to be factored into project costs. This cost is obviously the 
less important the smaller and less specific is the initial investment in the underlying 
asset. In addition, a long contract period lessens the disciplining power of ex ante 
competition, and it increases the likelihood of costly contract renegotiation.  
 
Also, that a PPP is established for service provision using privately owned assets might 
entail higher monitoring costs than in-house provision of the same service. The provision 
of most services is relatively difficult to measure and monitor, especially in terms of 
quality. While in-house provision, too, necessitates quality control, it can be argued that 
private asset ownership implies higher monitoring costs for the public sector. After all, if 
the asset were in public ownership the public sector could always ensure the desired 
service quality, while private ownership can jeopardise service quality due to excessive 
investment in productive efficiency. It is therefore more costly to maintain the desired 
service quality under private asset ownership. 
 
The high transaction costs can have the potential to erode the cost savings achieved 
through a PPP structure. Apart from their direct negative impact on the financial and 
economic viability of the project, the high cost of bidding constitutes an obvious hurdle 
for potential bidders to enter the bidding process. This, in turn, undermines the power of 
ex ante competition, which is in many infrastructure and public service sectors the only 
form of competition that can exist. The inability to harness the power of ex ante 
competition to support the quest for productive efficiency will, in turn, deter the creation 
of value for money through a PPP. Besides, as auction theory demonstrates, the design of 
  5the bidding process so as to avoid inefficiencies due to collusion or opportunistic 
behavior is difficult in general and in the case of long-term contracts in particular. 
 
3.  Description of data 
 
One reason for the absence of empirical studies of the transaction costs is obviously the 
lack of appropriate data. The problem is twofold: there is only limited information about 
transaction costs, and even when such information exists, it is often confidential in 
character. Add to that the still limited experience of the operation of PPP projects, 
especially from a longer-term perspective, and it would seem next to impossible to say 
anything general about the topic. 
 
There are, however, a number of data sources that can be combined to give an overview 
of the magnitude and also determinants of transaction costs in PPPs. For the public 
sector’s part, publicly available information compiled by the NAO and PAC can be used 
to create a database with 55 PPP projects in 6 different sectors of the UK economy.
1 
2 
The projects are identified in Appendix 1. The sample on the public sector’s transaction 
costs, which is illustrated in Graphs 1-3 below, covers some 10 percent all signed PPP 










                                                 
1 The actual number of projects is 64, but some were procured as a bundle, with reporting for the bundles 
aggregating all projects in it. This reduced the number of reporting units (individual projects or bundles) to 
55.  
2 Information about 14 projects was acquired by e-mail inquiries. 
  6Graph 1. Public sector transaction costs: Sample by sector 























































Sources: NAO, PAC 
 
 
  7Graph 3. Public sector transaction costs: Sample by year 
vers the procurement phase 
f the project. It comprises the project name; sector; capital value; year of financial close; 
th estimated and real); number of bidders; bid development cost; 
nancial, legal and techical advisory costs (disaggregated for 34 projects); contract 
ple comprises 32 projects in 3 sectors 

























Sources: NAO, PAC. 
 




length; and possible occurrence of refinancing.  
 
Turning to the sample on the private sector’s transaction costs, internal EIB documents 
were used to obtain information about transaction costs (bidding and contract negotiation 
costs) incurred by the winning bidder. The sam
(h
and is illustrated in Graphs 4-6 below. The list of individual projects included in the 
sample is not reproduced for confidentiality reasons. 
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  9Graph 6. Winning bidder’s transaction costs: Sample by year 
ic sector transaction costs, the sample on the private sector’s transaction 
osts is confined to the procurement phase. However, as mentioned in Section 2, 
as constrained as explained above, the empirical methods 






























monitoring and contract renegotiation costs during the operational phase are conceivably 
significant, especially as the operational phase stretches over decades in PPP projects. By 
excluding the transaction costs in the operational phase, we are underestimating overall 
transaction costs in PPPs, possibly by a significant amount. The estimation of overall 
transaction costs will, however, have to wait until a sufficient number of PPP projects 
have completed their entire life cycle, which is perhaps another two decades away.  
 
4. Empirical  methodology 
 
Given that data availability is 
th
standard statistical tests would be questionable, as they hinge on assumptions about the 
population distribution of the variables of interest that cannot be supported by our small 
sample size.  
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One can, however, resort to non-parametric tests to analyse the data. In examining the 
portance of the various possible determinants of transaction costs in Section 6 below, 
first test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, is used to assess whether all samples, which can be 
f different sizes, come from identical populations or not.
3 In our case, the samples 
t are thus:  
1: µi ≠ µj
notes the mean ranks of a sample. In other words, the null hypothesis has it 
at the mean ranks of all samples are equal, while the alternative has it that at least one 
sts uses the following test statistic: 
                                                
im
we will use two such non-parametric tests to assess whether the transaction costs vary 
significantly across different values of any one determinant, such as country, sector, 
project size, etc. This precludes, of course, the isolation of the individual impact of any 





represent projects in different countries or sectors; different project sizes etc. Thus, the 
aim is to test whether or not the samples differ significantly in terms of their transaction 
costs. The test is based on ranking each observation by magnitude, and the test itself aims 
to assess whether the samples differ from one another in terms of the variability of ranks 
within each sample. In other words, we can test whether transaction costs are equal across 
countries, sectors, project sizes, etc. 
 
The hypotheses for  the Kruskal-Wallis tes
 





sample originates from a different population. 
 
To test these hypotheses, the Kruskal-Wallis te
 
 
3 The Kruskal-Wallis test has also been described as the non-parametric equivalent of parametric analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). 
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where n denotes the size of a sample; k denotes the number of samples; and R denotes the 
m of ranks in a sample. For very small samples (n < 5 for each i and k < 4), the critical 
 all samples originate 
om identical populations, another test is required to test exactly which samples are 
1: A ≠ B or A > B or A < B 
on test is 
H
su
values for the test statistic have been tabled. For larger samples the test statistic H can be 
assumed to follow χ
2 distribution with (k –1) degrees of freedom.    
 
While the Kruskal-Willis test can be used to test the hypothesis that
fr
different in case the null hypothesis is rejected in the Kruskal-Willis tests. To that end, 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test can be employed.
4 It tests the null that two samples, call them 
A and B, originate from the same population against the alternative that they do not. The 
alternative hypothesis can also be formulated more precisely in form of an inequality 
between the samples. Formally: 
 
H0: A = B 
H
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4 As the Kruskal-Willis tests has been likened to ANOVA, the parametric counterpart of the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test would be a two-sample t-test. 
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For sufficiently large sample sizes, the test statistic z  is approximately normally 
distributed with mean E(T) and standard deviation σT. 
 case of the Kruskal-Wallis test. It 
an be used, for example, to test whether transaction costs differ between any two 
efore embarking on the analysis of the determinants of transaction costs, let us establish 
ection 3, there is actual data on the bidding and contract 
egotiation costs for the public sector as well as for the winning bidder. Notably, we are 
which only covers the UK, varying roughly between 1 and 7 percent of the 
apital value of the project across sectors (see Section 6.2. below). 
g bidder’s costs into 
idding and contract negotiation costs was available, the split is even, with bidding costs 
 
 
Intuitively, the Wilcoxon rank sum test assesses how two samples are located with 
respect to one another, based on ranked data as in the
c
countries, sectors, project sizes, etc. 
 
5.  Size of transaction costs 
 
B
their level. As described in S
n
interested in the total procurement phase transaction costs to the economy, not just the 
financial cost of the project, so we need to add the bidding costs for the failed bidders. In 
the absence of actual data on failed bidders’ costs they need to be estimated, as explained 
below. 
 




The winning bidder’s costs vary between 3.0 and 5.7 percent across sectors, averaging 
3.8 percent. In the 8 projects where a breakdown of the winnin
b
  13amounting to 1.9 percent and contract negotiation costs to another 1.9 percent of the 
project’s capital value. 
 
As for the failed bidders, costs for them were estimated based on information about the 
winning bidder’s bidding costs and the average number of bidders for the projects in the 
mple. Each failed bidder can be reasonably assumed to spend neither more nor much 
the 
apital value of the sampled projects, with the cost to public sector at 3.5 percent, cost to 
 to the failed bidders at about 5 percent.  
Notably, this estimate is unlikely to be significantly biased upward because of double-
counting that could arise if the winning bidder would systematically inflate his bidding 
sa
less than the winning bidder on the bidding process. As the winning bidder spends on 
average some 1.9 percent of the project’s capital value on bidding, and as the average 
number of bidders in our sample is 4, the costs incurred by the 3 failed bidders amount to 
some 5 percent of the project’s capital value.  
 













Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB, autors’ estimates. 
 
In sum, the procurement phase transaction costs average well over 10 percent of 
c
the winning bidder at 3.8 percent, and the cost
 
  14costs to cover his costs for bidding unsuccessfully for other projects. First, this would 
only happen if the winning bidder’s bidding costs were always reimbursed by the public 
sector, which is not the rule. Second, even in cases where the public sector reimburses 
ch costs, our estimates would not be double-counting them as the public sector figures 
 the analysis to follow mainly considers 
ansaction costs incurred by the winning bidder. 
 the absence of a rigorous theoretical model that could be used to determine a set of 
wing:  
•  number of bidders (proxying the intensity of competition at the bidding stage);  
pothesis that 




do not, to the best of our knowledge, include any such reimbursement. Besides, the 
winning bidder is most likely to recover his bidding costs through higher project cost 
rather than inflating his own bidding costs.  
 
6.  Determinants of transaction costs 
 
Having established their magnitude, let us then turn to an analysis of the determinants of 
procurement phase transaction costs in PPPs. Because of the absence of actual data on the 




determinants for the procurement phase transaction costs in PPPs, we resort to a more ad 
hoc –approach and investigate the relationship between transaction costs and a number of 
variables that could conceivably affect the magnitude of transaction costs and for which 
data are available. Such variables include the follo
 
•  project country (approximating differences between legal systems);  
•  economic sector;  
•  project size (capital value);  
•  length of procurement process (approximating, among other things, the 
complexity of the project);  
•  the year when the project was signed (accounting for the hy
transaction costs 
facilitating the set-up process
  15Eac o





urement phase transaction costs to winning bidder in road projects by 
ountry (in % of capital value) 
Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB. 
 
As the graph above illustrates, there is some cross-country variation. The costs are 
highest in the UK at about double those in Portugal and some two-thirds higher than in 
Ireland and the Netherlands.  
 
h  f these factors is considered in turn below. Although some of the factors are 
ly interdependent, the analy
y” dimension because of data limitations. The results of the statistical tests a
us ed qualitatively in this Section; the detailed results are reported in Appendices 2-9. 
untry 
 
A comparison of transaction costs across countries has to be limited to the private sector 
partner’s (winning bidder’s) bidding and negotiation costs in the absence of the public 
sector’s costs for countries outside the UK. To control, at least, for differences across 









UK Ireland The Netherlands Portugal
5%
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  16That the UK has higher costs would appear obvious because of its common law legal 
system, which necessitates high legal advisory costs. However, if that were the only 
factor at play, the costs in Ireland should be high, too. What other factors may play a role 




As regards cross-sectoral variation, the graph below suggests that the transaction costs 
are roughly equal for the public sector and the winning bidder in hospital and road 
projects, adding up to 8 and 6 percent of the project’s capital value, respectively.  
 
Graph 9. Procurement phase transaction costs by sector (in % of capital value) 
 bidder 
shoulders three-quarters of them. There is no obvious explanation to this observation, but 
there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the public sector tends to use in-house 
resources instead of external technical advisors (e.g., architects) in school projects, which 


















Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB. 
 
In school projects, the total comes also to about 7.5 percent, although the winning
  17in-house resources would still be there and should be added to the explicitly accounted 
 
There is also significant variation between the 3 sectors for which we only have data on 
public sector transaction costs. Notably, the ICT sector includes an outlier, where 
transaction costs amounted to over 20 percent of the project’s capital value. Without that 
outlier, the average for the ICT sector would be 3 percent.  
 
Interestingly, the public sector’s transaction costs for prison projects appear very small. 
Obviously, this does not necessarily mean that overall transaction costs are low: as with 
school projects, the winning bidder may bear the bulk of them or they can be, at least in 
part, not explicitly accounted for. 
 
.3. Size of project 
urning to the size (capital value) of the project, small projects are associated with higher 




transaction costs (relative to the size of the project)  for both public and private sectors. 
For the public sector, as illustrated below, projects with a capital value below £25 million 
have significantly higher transaction costs than bigger projects. For the private sector, 
projects with a capital value below £100 million are significantly more expensive to bid 











  18Graph 10. Procurement phase transaction costs for the public sector by project size 
(in % of capital value) 
 
Sources: NAO, PAC. 
 
Graph 11. Procurement phase transaction costs for the winning bidder by project 
ze (in % of capital value) 
Source: EIB. 
 
Note that the small number of projects in the sample necessitates different size 
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These findings lend some support to the notion that the high transaction costs in PPPs 
necessitate a minimum project size for a partnership to be a financially and economically 
viable option. In the UK, a project size in excess of £20 is now considered necessary for 
the PPP option to be considered in the first place. 
 
6.4. Procurement time 
 
As regards the procurement time for the project—which reflects in part the complexity of 
the project—it turns out, unsurprisingly, that projects with long procurement time are 
ssociated with significantly higher transaction costs, at least for the public sector. More 
ms to be a statistically significant structural break in transaction 
osts when procurement time exceeds 50 months: projects that take longer than that to 
below 50 months.  
 
Graph 12. Procurement phase transaction costs for the public sector by 











20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 over 50
Procurement time in months
 
Sources: NAO, PAC, Official Journal of the European Communities 
 
  20The illustration of the link between transaction costs and procurement time above 
warrants two comments. First, the bars illustrate median values in each interval, and 
while the interval above 50 months has the highest median value, it is not obvious from 
the median values alone that there is significant structural break at 50 months. However, 
e nonparametric statistical tests are based on ranking the data instead of considering 
lues, and such tests suggest unambiguously the presence of a 
reak at 50 months. Second, as with project size, the split of the data into intervals is 
 the public-sector cost of bidding to increase with the number of 
idders. Interestingly, that hypothesis is not validated by our sample. Data on the number 
 costs for the public sector and the winning 












median (or average) va
b
dictated by the requirement that each interval contain a sufficient number of observations; 
hence, interval lengths other than those considered would weaken the power of tests 
employed. 
 




of bidders was available for 23 projects, with the number of bidders varying between 1 


















Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB. 
 
While there is no obvious economic reason why transaction costs for the winning bidder 
would peak with exactly three bidders, it is conceivable that the explanation lies in the 
way that the presence of three bidders combines the intensity of competition and the 
likelihood for a bid to succeed. From the perspective of an individual bidder, the presence 
f two other bidders renders the bidding process at the same time competitive and 
asonably likely to result in success. Therefore, any bidder has the incentives to spend 
uite a lot to win the contract. Such incentives are weaker if either the number of bidders 
 smaller (which curtails competition and increases the likelihood of winning even if 
ttle is spent) or larger (which reduces the likelihood of winning).  
hile the absence of competition would therefore seem to be associated with relatively 
w costs of bidding and contract negotiation, it is likely that it increases costs down the 
ad as the lack of competition is likely to result in higher overall costs of the project to 












  22Considering total procurement phase transaction costs to the economy—thus including 
of capital value
also the bidding costs incurred by failed bidders—we find an irregular pattern, illustrated 
below. The bidding costs of failed bidders have been estimated by considering the 
bidding costs of the winning bidder in each category (estimated at one-half of his 
procurement phase transaction costs, as explained in Section 5 above) together with the 
number of failed bidders in each case. There is still a large increase from 2 to 3 bidders, 
but the pattern for 3 or more bidders is irregular. Obviously, a larger number of 
observations in the categories above 3 bidders would be needed to establish the 
relationship between the number of bidders and total bidding costs with any degree of 
confidence. 
 
Graph 14. Total procurement phase transaction costs by number of bidders (in % 
) 
ources: NAO, PAC, EIB, authors’ estimates. 



















Transaction costs do not seem to decline systematically over time. The chart below shows 
su
  23shows separately the public sector’s transaction costs in hospital projects, as they 
constitute the single largest sector in the sample. 
 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Winning bidder Public Public-hospital
 
Sources: NAO, PAC, EIB. 
 
There is no statistically significant trend in the private sector transaction costs. Notably, 
the extreme values for the private sector (1998 and 1999) only represent one single 
observation each and should therefore be taken with a grain of salt. Similarly, there is no 
significant trend in the public sector transaction costs overall, nor in hospital projects. 
 
These findings contrast with the efforts, most advanced in the UK, to reduce transaction 
sing PPP contracts. While the time series analysed above remain short, 
ne cannot at this stage reject the possibility that PPP contracts necessitate such a high 








  247. Conclusions 
 
This first systematic attempt at quantifying the transaction costs of PPPs suggests the 
following conclusions. First, even if only the transaction costs related to the procurement 
hase are considered—thus ignoring the additional costs of monitoring and renegotiating 
capital value of the project. The public sector and the winning bidder’s costs reach some 
7 percent, which is split between the public sector and the winning bidder roughly 
equally in hospital and road projects, while the winning bidder shoulders the bulk of the 
costs in school projects. In addition, the aggregate costs incurred by failed bidders can be 
estimated at some 5 percent of the project’s capital value, brining the total procurement 
phase transaction costs to well over 10 percent. 
 
Second, transaction costs (in percent of projects’ capital value) to the public sector and 
the winning bidder vary between countries (legal systems) and sectors, and they are 
significantly higher in small projects (below £25 million for the public sector) and in 
projects that take long (over 50 months) to procure. In contrast, neither experience in 
p partnerships nor the number of bidders affect the costs to the public sector and 
e winning bidder. 
hese results offer some first insights into the issue, but it is important to recognise what 
gs 
therwise achieved by a PPP structure, although that extent would seem to be significant. 
p





they do not do. They do not tell us anything about the magnitude of the difference 
between traditional public procurement of investment projects and PPPs in terms of 
transaction costs; however, the prior remains that PPPs are more expensive to set up. 
Also, these results do not tell us to what extent transaction costs eat up cost savin
o
Both these issues are for future research to tackle. 
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1.  Darenth Valley Hospital 
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5.  University Hospital of North Durham 
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2. Radiocommunications  Agency S
3.  Defence Fixed Telecommunications Service 








1.  HMP Altcourse (Fazakerley) 
2. HMP  Bronzefield 
HMP  Peterborough 
4.  HMP Parc (Bridgend) 
5. HMP  Kilmarnock 
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3.  t of the Treasury Building, Government Offices Great George 
6.  Main Building Refurbishment 
1. PRIME 
2.  Home Office Central London Accommodation Strategy 
Redevelopmen
Street 
4. Berlin  Embassy 
5.  Newcastle Estate Development 
MoD 
7. STEPS 
8. Hereford  and  Worcester Magistrates' Court   
9.  Derbyshire Magistrates' Courts   
 
ROADS
1.  A1 (M) Alconbury to Peterborough 
ink Road 
6.  A19 Dishforth to Tyne Tunnel DBFO 
Project 




   Gloucester DBFO 
 
2.  M1 –A1 L
3.  A50/A564 Stoke-Derby Link DBFO 
4. A30/A35  Exeter  to Bere Regis DBFO 
5.  M40 Junctions 1 to 15 
7. M6  DBFO 
9.  A55 Llandygai to Holyhead T
10. Newport Southern D
11. A69 Carslile to Newc
12. A419/A417 Swindon to
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Sector Kruskal-Wallis Test Time series




up Rank Sum Observations Group
pitals 842.5 25 1995 31
Schools 126 9 1996 15




Prison S 23 3 1998 353 11
ICT 120 4 1999 276 7
Roa 5 200 d 133 0 251 10
2001 183 7
H S 200 tat  15.7895 2 122 4
df 200 5 3 35 3
p-va 200 lue 0.0075 4 45 2
chi-s r
H Stat  14.3418
df 9
Kru p-value 0.1107
chi-squared Critical   16.919
Group
qua ed Critical   11.0705
skal-Wallis Test Nr of bidders
Rank Sum Observations
1 22 2
2 20 2 Kruskal-Wallis Test Capital value
3 139.5 11
4 73 6 Group Rank Sum Observations
over 4 21.5 2 0-25 224 5
25-50 428.5 14
H S 50-7 tat  0.4001 5 361 12
df 75-10 4 0 164 6
p-va 0.9825 100-12 lue 5 125 5
chi-s r 9.4877 125-15 qua ed Critical   0 26 2
150-175 63 4
175-200 45 1
Kru over 20 skal-Wallis Test Procurement time 0 103.5 6
Gro tions H Stat  14.1769
 to 2 7 df 8
20-2 p-value 0.0773






















quared Critical   14.0671
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Kruskal-Wallis Test Sector Kruskal-Wallis Test Nr of bidders
Group Rank Sum Observations Group Rank Sum Observations
Road 240 18 1 41
Hospital 149 8 2 58 3
School 139 6 3 99 5
4 173 10
H Stat  5.492 over 4 194 13
df 2
p-value 0.0642 H Stat  3.1081
chi-squared Critical   5.9915 df 4
p-value 0.5399
chi-squared Critical   9.4877
Kruskal-Wallis Test Country
Group Rank Sum Observations Kruskal-Wallis Test Country
UK 48 4
Portugal 70 9 Group Rank Sum Observations
Ireland 30 3 UK 48 4
The Netherlands 23 2 Portugal 70 9
Ireland 30 3
H Stat  2.1209 The Netherlands 23 2
df 3
p-value 0.5477 H Stat  2.1209
chi-squared Critical   7.8147 df 3
p-value 0.5477
chi-squared Critical   7.8147
Kruskal-Wallis Test Capital value
Group Rank Sum Observations
 to 150 319 15
150-300 95 7
300-450 53 4
over 450 61 6
H Stat  7.7701
df 3
p-value 0.051
chi-squared Critical   7.8147
Kruskal-Wallis Test Years










H Stat  12.1718
df 8
p-value 0.1437
chi-squared Critical   15.5073
GAppendix 4. Wilcoxon rank Sum tests on private sector country data  
 






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.28
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5176
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 1
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.6434
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 5
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2386
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.4794
z Critical two-tail 1.96
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z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0004
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0104
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 3
Rank Sum Observations
Hospitals 437.5 25
Gov. Building 157.5 9
z Stat 0
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.5
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 1
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3302
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3532
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 6
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.4634
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.456
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.101
z Critical two-tail 1.96Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 9
          
ICT 15 3
Gov. Building 63 9
z Stat -0.8321
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.2027
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.4054
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 10
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2294
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1616
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 12
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0334
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 13
Rank Sum Observations
Schools 59 9
Gov. Building 112 9
z Stat -2.34
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0096
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0192
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Rank Sum Observations






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.9264
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5126
z Critical two-tail 1.96
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 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.2216
z Critical two-tail 1.96








choo S l 50 6
 Stat -0.6455
Z<=z) one-tail 0.2593
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.5186
 Critical two-tail 1.96










S l 110 6
z Stat -2.3333
Z<=z) one-tail 0.0098
 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.0196
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z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0518
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0916
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0678
z Critical two-tail 1.96
4






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0472
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0528
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.05
z Critical two-tail 1.96
7
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test
Rank Sum Observations
0-25 43 5
over 200 23 6
z Stat 2.3735
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0088
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0176
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3798
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.837
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.708
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5838
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 1
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1572
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 15
Rank Sum Observations
175-200 71
over 200 21 6
z Stat 1.5
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0668
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1336










 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.0528














z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5094
z Critical two-tail 1.96
  37  38





z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3546
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1124
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.137
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3546








Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 21
um Observations
25-50 170.5 14




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0526
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2734
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.527
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1822
z Critical two-tail 1.96 






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.4226
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 26
Rank Sum Observations
50-75 127 12
over 200 44 6
z Stat 1.2176
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.1117
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2234
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1824
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
(Z<=z) two-tail 0.088
 Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1336
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 30
Rank Sum Observations
75-100 45 6
over 200 33 6
z Stat 0.9608
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.1683
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3366
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3272
z Critical two-tail 1.96











z Critical two-tail 1.96
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Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 33
Rank Sum Observations
100-125 37 5
over 200 29 6
z Stat 1.278
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.1006
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2012
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2206
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 35
Rank Sum Observations
125-150 10 2
over 200 26 6
z Stat 0.3333
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.3694
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.7388
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 36
Rank Sum Observations
150-175 20 4
over 200 35 6
z Stat -0.4264
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.3349


































Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 1
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0722
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.8502
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 3
Rank Sum Observations
300-450 24 4
over 450 31 6
z Stat 0.4264
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.3349
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.6698
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 4
Rank Sum Observations
 to 150 197 15
over 450 34 6
z Stat 2.4912
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0064
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0128
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 5
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5678
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 6
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1616
z Critical two-tail 1.96
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Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 1 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 5
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Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3798
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5676
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1616
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1746






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 1
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 6
Rank Sum Observations
40-45 21 6
over 50 45 5
z Stat -2.7386
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0031
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0062
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.3272
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.6408
z Critical two-tail 1.96 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 9
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.9578
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 10
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.5698
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 11
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0618
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 12
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0864
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.9168
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.8552
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.1004
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 16
Rank Sum Observations




z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0882
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.4624
z Critical two-tail 1.96






z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2052
z Critical two-tail 1.96
  43Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 19 24
Rank Sum Observations
35-40 15 5
over 50 40 5
z Stat -2.6112
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0045
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.009
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 25
Rank Sum Observations
40-45 21 6
over 50 45 5
z Stat -2.7386
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0031
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0062
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 26
Rank Sum Observations
25-30 45 9
over 50 60 5
z Stat -3
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0013
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0026
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 27
Rank Sum Observations
20-25 55 10
over 50 65 5
z Stat -3.0619
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0011
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0022
z Critical two-tail 1.96
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 28
Rank Sum Observations
to 20 28 7
over 50 50 5
z Stat -2.842
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0.0022
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.0044







 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.7134
 Critical two-tail 1.96






 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.2328
 Critical two-tail 1.96





















 Critical one-tail 1.6449
Z<=z) two-tail 0.1572
 Critical two-tail 1.96














 Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.2506
 Critical two-tail 1.96
lcoxon Rank Sum Test 23
Rank Sum Observations
35 15 5
er 50 40 5
z Stat -2.6112
Z<=z) one-tail 0.0045
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.009
z Critical two-tail 1.96
z
P(
z
z
Wi
30-
ov
P(
 